Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2011-33
Security issues addressed in SeaMonkey 2.3
- Announced
- August 16, 2011
- Impact
- Critical
- Products
- SeaMonkey
- Fixed in
-
- SeaMonkey 2.3
Miscellaneous memory safety hazards (rv:4.0)
Impact: Critical
Description: Mozilla identified and fixed several
memory safety bugs in the browser engine used in SeaMonkey 2.2 and other
Mozilla-based products. Some of these bugs showed evidence of memory corruption
under certain circumstances, and we presume that with enough effort at least
some of these could be exploited to run arbitrary code.
References:
Aral Yaman reported a WebGL crash which affected SeaMonkey 2.2.
Vivekanand Bolajwar reported a JavaScript crash which affected SeaMonkey 2.2.
Bert Hubert and Theo Snelleman of Fox-IT reported a crash in the Ogg reader which affected SeaMonkey 2.2.
Mozilla developers and community members Robert Kaiser, Jesse Ruderman, moz_bug_r_a4, Mardeg, Gary Kwong, Christoph Diehl, Martijn Wargers, Travis Emmitt, Bob Clary and Jonathan Watt reported memory safety issues which affected SeaMonkey 2.2.
Unsigned scripts can call script inside signed JAR
Impact: Critical
Description: Rafael Gieschke
reported that unsigned JavaScript could call into script inside a signed JAR
thereby inheriting the identity of the site that signed the JAR as well as any
permissions that a user had granted the signed JAR.
References:
String crash using WebGL shaders
Impact: Critical
Description: Michael Jordon of
Context IS reported that an overly long shader program could cause a buffer
overrun and crash in a string class used to store the shader source code.
References:
Heap overflow in ANGLE library
Impact: Critical
Description: Michael Jordon of
Context IS reported a potentially exploitable heap overflow in the ANGLE library
used by Mozilla's WebGL implementation.
References:
Crash in SVGTextElement.getCharNumAtPosition()
Impact: Critical
Description: Security
researcher regenrecht reported via TippingPoint's Zero Day
Initiative that a SVG text manipulation routine contained a dangling pointer
vulnerability.
References:
Credential leakage using Content Security Policy reports
Impact: High
Description: Mike Cardwell
reported that Content Security Policy violation reports failed to strip out
proxy authorization credentials from the list of request headers. Daniel
Veditz reported that redirecting to a website with Content Security
Policy resulted in the incorrect resolution of hosts in the constructed
policy.
References:
Cross-origin data theft using canvas and Windows D2D
Impact: High
Description: nasalislarvatus3000
reported that when using Windows D2D hardware acceleration, image data from one
domain could be inserted into a canvas and read by a different domain.
References: